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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER
OF EQUITY COURTS TO ENJOIN NUISANCES
CYRus D. SHABAZ
T HE recent cases where injunctions have been granted in favor of
the State to abate a nuisance are in reality no new thing to equi-
table jurisdiction. It is nothing but a mere harking back to the old
court of chancery, where no limitation was put on that court and it
served to protect people and property from violence.
There was a turbulent time in early England when chancery was used
frequently to preserve peace and prevent crime. But this jurisdiction
was always unpopular and the rights of equity to intervene in criminal
matters gradually was lost, due to much more efficient prosecution by
the government which was becoming more stable. Toward the end
of the fifteenth century the jurisdiction almost ceased,' but it was not
until the eighteenth century that the chancery court became firmly es-
tablished and then made no more attempt at all to enforce the criminal
laws. In I818, equity refused to take jurisdiction, and Lord Eldon
said, in that year, "The publication of a libel is a crime, and I have no
jurisdiction to prevent the commission of crime.2 Upon this decision
equity has based her refusal to assume jurisdiction in criminal matters.
But equity always could protect property from irreparable injury,
even though the act was also a crime, and in the following classes of
cases equity always took jurisdiction, which jurisdiction was an excep-
tion to the very general and important rule that equity could not inter-
fere in the enforcement of the criminal laws.
i. To restrain perpetures of public highways and navigation.
2. To restrain threatened nuisances, dangerous to the health of the
whole community.
3. To restrain ultra vires acts of corporations, injurious to public
right.
Except for these three classes of cases equity almost universally re-
fused to intervene in criminal matters but still an occasional case was
decided wherein equity enjoined against the commission of a crime and
around these scattered decisions the present equitable jurisdiction grew.
In i86I the Lord Chancellor granted the Emperor of Austria an injunc-
"Revival of Criminal Equity," i6 Harvard Law Review 391.
2 Gee v. Prichard, 2 Swans. 402 at 413.
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tion restraining one Kossuth from printing and passing counterfeit
notes, even though the act complained of was a crime.3
Thus- the jurisdiction to abate nuisances developed through a crystall-
ization of these cases and the name nuisance was applied to any place
conducted in a noisy or wanton manner.
The Supreme court of Indiana in 18954 granted an injunction in the
name of the State against a corporation where the corporation was mis-
using its charter and maintaining its property as a nuisance, even
though the act was a crime also, Chief Justice Howard said, "Extraor-
dinary emergencies in many cases call for extraordinary remedies. The
rule to be observed from such cases is quoted at page 366 from Lord
Chancellor Cottenham 'That it is the power of courts of equity to adopt
its practice and course of proceedings, as far as possible, to the existing
state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new cases
which, from the progress daily making in the affairs of men, must con-
tinually arise, and not from too strict an adherence to forms and rules
established under very different circumstances.'
So here wd have this court, and other equally respectable courts,
under the general jurisdiction of equity issuing an injunction to pre-
vent a threatened nuisance which at the same time, if committed, is also
a crime.
In Missouri in I9O7,5 equity under its general jurisdiction issued an
injunction against a bull fight to be held near the World's Fair Exposi-
tion. An act displayed before a public audience, which is debasing in
its character, is a public nuisance which equity will enjoin, notwith-
standing that the act may also be a crime. Though one charged with a
crime has a constitutional right to a jury trial, one who intends to com-
mit an act which is both a crime and a public nuisance has no constitu-
tional right to commit it in order that he may enjoy the right of trial by
jury, but may be enjoined from committing the act by a court of equity.
This has not been a universal rule of equity but courts all over the
country have gradually ben getting in line and following the decisions
of the above cases.
Mr. Olmstead in his article in the American Bar Association Journal"
seems to differ with the writer of this article saying, "No case has been
cited where, under the general jurisdiction of a court of equity, an in-
junction -has been granted in behalf of the public to restrain a person
from selling intoxicating liquors, or from keeping them for sale in
'The Enmperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth, 3 De. G. F. and J. 216.
" Columbia Athletic Club v. State, 40 N. E. 914.
'State ex rel. Attorney General, 105 S. W. 1o78.
' American Bar Association Journal, Vol. XI, No. 6, June 1925.
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violation of statutes, or from doing similar acts which have been pro-
hibited on general considerations of public policy. So far as appears,
courts acting under their general equity powers have refused to enter-
tain suits brought for this purpose." And in support of his stand cites
Missouri v. Uhrig7 and State v. Crawford.8
No doubt Mr. Olmstead has overlooked the two cases cited by this
writer, Columbia Athletic Club v. State and State ex-rel Attorney Gen-
eral v. Canty (Supra) which are contrary to the proposition Mr. Olin-
stead states. Even the case he cites as his authority does not support
him when given more than a superficial reading, meaning the case of
State v. Crawford (Supra.)
In that case, Justice Valentine says, "In Attorney General v. Utica
Insurance Co.,9 Chancellor Kent seems to express an opinion that courts
of equity do not have jurisdiction to restrain the commission of nui-
sances or other acts which are at the same time criminal offenses. We
cannot follow this decision to its full and entire extent; for, unques-
tionably, the great weight of authority as well as of reason is against
that doctrine. We think courts of equity certainly have jurisdiction to
enjoin nuisances, although such nuisances may at the same time be
public offenses."
So, while the injunction was refused, the case is no authority at all
for Mr. Olmstead's article, as the court distinguished the cases and,
while refusing the injunction in the instant case, admitted equity had
authority under a different set of facts to restrain the illegal sale of
liquor.
These cases show how equitable jurisdiction has developed in its
power to abate and close a saloon, even without an express statute de-
claring the saloon to be a nuisance. At common law the legislature had
the unquestioned power to define a public nuisance and extend it to new
classes of cases, as was done in 1833 when Parliament passed an act
prohibiting erection of a building within ten feet of the road and
declared any building erected contrary to this law a nuisance.10
This old rule has been followed and brought down to date in United
States v. Reisenweber"1 and the court said, "It is within the power of
the legislature to prescribe what shall be a nuisance, and it may make
that a nuisance which was not one at common law. See Moss v. United
States, I6 App. D.C. 428, 50 L.R.A. 532; State v. Beardsley, "(79 N.W.
TMissouri v. Uhrig, 14 Mo. Appeals 413.
'State v. Crawford, 28 Kansas 726, Book 31 Pacific State Reports Extra An-
notated.
'Attorntey General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. 371.
'5 B. & A. D. 555 (iio Eng. Reports 895).
U. S. v. Reisenweber, 288 Fed. 520.
POWER OF EQUITY COURTS TO ENJOIN NUISANCES 35
138; 68 L.R.A. 402.) And inasmuch as the Eighteenth Amendment
makes the traffic in intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes unlawful,
we do not doubt the constitutional power of Congress to enact that any
place where liquor is sold in violation of this act is declared a common
nuisance, as provided in section 21."
So Congress in passing the Volstead Act took advantage of this com-
mon law power, as have many state legislatures, and declared saloons
a common nuisance. The law has been upheld in almost all courts and
in only a few cases have courts held it unconstitutional. In a Nebraska
case the law was held squarely unconstitutional but this case seems out
of line with the authority and the doctrine announced by it has not been
followed in any other court. Nevertheless, part of the case can be dis-
tinguished and brought in line with the rest of the cases. Justice Wood-
worth simply held and correctly, that Congress cannot take ordinary
evidence and raise it to the level of conclusive evidence, as they have
done when they declare an act, which was a nuisance within sixty days
previous to the filing of the writ is presumed to be a nuisance at time
of the hearing. The judge held that the government must show the
nuisance actually in existence at the time of the hearing, or the writ
will be dismissed. So the case went off on a point of evidence on which
Justice Woodworth held, correctly, with the weight of authority that the
law, as to that part of the Prohibition act which deals with the presump-
tion must be dclared unconstitutional. 12
So with the discovery of this old common law power Congress "put
teeth" into the Volstead Act by enacting sections 21, 22, and 23. Con-
gress, forseeing the troubled sea over which the act would have to sail,
brought out this seemingly novel remedy which really was hundreds of
years old. Valid and legitimate remedies often lie dormant for years,
simply because no fair opportunity is presented to put them in opera-
tion, as was the case here. But Congress was guided by decisions of
courts construing statutes similiar to the Volstead act .maic passed in the
-states years previous.
In Georgia there was an optional prohibition law in effect and in 1897
the supreme court of that state issued an injunction restraining the
threatened illegal sale of liquor. The court said:
The presiding judge granted the injunction on the sole ground that
a judicial sale of spirituous liquors in a county where the option law
is in effect is a public nuisance and contravenes the terms of the
act. If, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him by law, he
should find that the facts alleged are true, he has full power to prevent
an irregular or illegal sale, either by grant or an injunction or other
direction.2i
"U. S. v. Lot 29, City of Omaha, 296 Fed. 729.
'State v. Fegar, 29 S. E. 463 (Ga.).
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Under a similiar statute an injunction was issued in Iowa over the
contention of the plaintiffs that they should have a jury trial because
the act committed was also a crime.14 But the court did not punish the
act as a crime but merely as a violation of the injunction and the plain-
tiffs could still get their jury trial when they were punished for the
crime.
This was followed by a later case in the same court where the judge
said, "The right to trial by jury in chancery cases was not guaranteed
in the constitution and Iowa courts having well-settled jurisdiction to
abate nuisances before the act was passed, that statute is not unconstitu-
tional because it declares the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors a nui-
sance. 1 And authority to support this is listed in 16 A.L.R. at page
397; 149 Mass. 550; 66 N.H. 39; 46 Kan. 695; 5 N. Dak. 147.
The same remedy was also used effectively against bawdy houses
where by statute these places were declared nuisances and equity took
jurisdiction and closed them. In Massachusetts the courts recognized
this old principle and in following the case of Carlton v. Rugg16 the
court thirty years later in Chase v. Proprietors Revere House17 spoke to
the same effect saying, "jurisdiction of equity over abatement of a
nuisance, whether public or private, is settled, and may be exercised,
although the nuisance is made by statute an indictable offense."
Wisconsin has a statute similar to the Massachusetts statute referred
to, and under section 280.09 bawdy houses may be closed for one year.
The supreme court of Wisconsin in 191611 declared that an injunction
may issue closing, for one year, property used for purposes of lewdness
upon satisfactory showing of such use.
These cases show the law among the several states and to this can be
added the unqualified support of the U. S. Supreme Court. When the
Eilenbecker case (supra) was appealed to that court, the court said, "If
the objection to the statute is that it authorizes the nature of a suit in
equity to suppress Lhe sale of intoxicating liquors, and to abate a nuisance
which the statute declares such acts to be, we respond that it appears to
us that all powers of a court, whether at common law or in chancery
may be called into operation to suppress this objectionable traffic; and
we know of no! hindrance in the Constitution of the United States.
Certainly it seems to us to be quite as wise to use the process of the
court to prevent the evil as to punish the offense after it has been com-
mitted."' 9
" Eilenbecher v. District Courth of Plymouth County, 28 N. W. 551 (1886).
' State v. Jordan, 34 N. W. 285.
1 8149 Mass. 550; 5 L.R.A. 195.
17 232 Mass. 88; 122 N.E. 162.
"State Ex rel. Zavel v. Grefig, 164 Wis. 74, 159 N.W. 560.
19 134 U.S. 31.
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.This last case is based on the holding of a previous case, Mugler v.
Kansas2' which lays down the proposition that the state has the au-
thority to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors for other than medical
purposes. We do not doubt her power to declare any place, kept for the
sale of such liquor, to be a common nuisance, and, at the same time,
provide for indictment if the offender. One is against the property
used for a forbidden purpose, and the other for the punishment of the
offender.
The court has given finality to its decision that the Volstead Act is
constitutional in Street v. Lincoln Deposit Co.,21 where the court said
that the attack of unconstitutionality based on the ground that property
was taken without due process must fail because of the decision in
Mugler v. Kansas. (supra.)
These are all the authorities that can be cited here in support of that
proposition, except to mention that the rule is followed in Powell v.
Pennsylvania22 and Kansas v. Zeibold,23 reported with the Mugler case.
(supra.)
The claim as to unconstitutionality because of double jeopardy must
also fall, due to the decision of ln re Debs, 24 where the court said that
equity has power to interfere by injunction in cases of public nuisances
and this interference is not destroyed by the fact that the acts are also
violations of the criminal law. The court, enforcing obedience to its
orders, is not executing the criminal law, nor invading the constitutional
right of trial by jury.
Many more authorities are cited and analyzed by Mr. Chacon of
Colorado in his very able article in the American Bar Association
Journal,2 in which he goes into the recent cases in support of the
Volstead Act thoroughly.
The purpose of this article is not to justify or to condemn equitable
jurisdiction but just to show the foundation on which it rests. What
sections 21, 22 and 23 of the Volstead act do is no novel doctrine. In
the beginning, the old chancery court had unlimited power in both
criminal and civil matters, but as the government became more stable
this criminal jurisdiction fell off and gradually ceased equity then
only retained jurisdiction in three classes of criminal cases, notably the
right to restrain against a threatened nuisance dangerous to the health
of the whole community. Then this application of equity to prohibit
"Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623.
'Street v. Lincoln Deposit Co., 254 U.S. 88.
"Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678.
' Kansas v. Zeibold 123 U.S. 623.
'
4In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564.
'American Bar Association Journal, Vol. XI No. 8-page 663.
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nuisances began to be extended, first under the general jurisdiction of
equity without an assisting statute. But this extended jurisdiction was
not followed in all cases, so legislatures passed statutes defining nui-
sances and extending it to new classes of cases. And the result of
this development is seen in sections 21 and 22 of the Volstead act.
Thus we see that this remedy, while it has not been used locally
previous to last year, is not new, but is an old common law doctrine,
laid on the solid foundation of equitable jurisdiction, and developed
through the ages, merely having laid dormant for many years, waiting
for an opportunity to be called into use.
But how are we to explain the startling increasing use of equity in
the last few years? Let us hope it does not mean we are going back
to something like the turbulent time of Richard II when there was a
breaking down of centralized government and the powerful barons so
overawed the local courts that the only way to obtain convictios for
crime -'Was to give chancery that power. Perhaps the legislatures and
congress saw what almost insurmountable difficulties would confront
the Prohibition act; that juries would hesitate long before convicting
the defendant. Perhaps Congress lost faith in the ability of the prose-
cuting officials to get convictions and so deemed it wiser to allow equity
through the Federal courts to enforce the act, feeling that they are less
likely to be moved by political influence. But most likely, the extension
of power has been due to a lessening of popular distrust of the judges,
.due to the elective nature of the judiciary. Then too the existence if
new questions to be settled by the courts of equity have gradually ac-
customed the people to a broader use of equitable jurisdictions and they
do not mind it as much as before. But how far will equity go in the
future to enforce the criminal laws? Our own court said in 1904, "The
jurisdiction of equity is defined by principles not by precedents: the
former govern, the latter illustrate. New principles are not to be added
by judicial policy but old ones are subject to development to meet new
conditions.
26
This being the fundamental principle in which equity works, it is
entirely problematical as to what may happen in the future but if the
extension of fhe power continues in the future as it has in the past we
may expect some startling developments.
Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 9! N.W. 909.
